Federalism and fiscal reform in India. by M. Govinda Rao & Sen, Tapas K.
Federalism and Fiscal Reform in India 
 

























































                                                  
∗ Director,  National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi.   
   Email: mgr@nipfp.org.in 
∗∗ Professor, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi.   
    Email: tapas@nipfp.org.in 
Paper presented in the conference on “Federalism and Economic Reform” organised by the 
Australian National University, Canberra and National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, 








This paper attempts to analyse the experience of incentivising economic 
reforms at the state level through central transfers to states.  It reviews the 
experiences of the central government introducing incentives for reform directly 
through various specific purpose transfers as well as the incentive schemes 
recommended by various Finance Commissions.  The incentive schemes directly 
introduced by the central government include, accelerated irrigation benefit 
programme, accelerated power development and reform programme, Jawaharlal 
Nehru Urban Renewal Mission, education and health sector reforms.   The reforms 
recommended by the Finance Commissions include incentivising tax reforms and 
fiscal restructuring and consolidation. 
  
The review of the experiences of Indian fiscal federalism shows that the 
incentivising reforms have neither been an unqualified success nor have they been a 
total failure.  There are interesting lessons to be learnt from the experiences for both 
designing the incentive schemes and implementing them.  The paper summarises the 
lessons of experience.  While incorporating these in designing and implementing 
incentive schemes can be useful in the short and medium term, what matters in the 
long run is the political incentive for reforms. 
 
 








  Calibrating reforms in fiscal federalism is a major challenge.  Although the “layer 
cake” perspective of fiscal federalism attempts to assign macroeconomic stabilisation 
and redistribution functions predominantly to the central government and a significant 
role to the sub-national governments in allocation, in reality, there is considerable 
overlapping of the functions.  Furthermore, the actions of one level of government 
impacts on others.  Besides, interdependence of economic policies necessarily results in 
overlapping and coordinating the policies between different levels of government is a 
major challenge faced in all multilevel fiscal systems.  The problem is particularly 
important in coordinating the calibration of economic reforms as the interests and 
incentives of different levels of government do not necessarily coincide.  
   
Fiscal federalism in India is faced with challenges of calibrating reforms in 
policies and institutions to meet the requirements of markets and globalisation.  The 
fiscal system in the first 40 years was shaped by the requirements of public sector 
dominated, heavy industry-based import substituting industrialisation strategy and this 
has to be reoriented to respond to market-based development.  The transition involves 
difficult initiatives in reforming both policies and institutions to ensure free flow of factors 
and products across the country.  The states which have more developed markets and 
with greater market friendly environment will attract capital and skilled labour and 
develop faster than others.  Furthermore, both central and state governments have to 
respond to the globalising environment.  This requires creation of market-friendly policy 
environment and institutions.  In the past, centralised planning had limited role to play in 
the sub-national governments in development.  In addition, regulations and controls on 
quantities and prices introduced both as instruments to deal with centralised planning 
and to meet scarcity conditions, severely segmented the market.  
   
  Market-based development of the economy in a globalising environment 
requires significant change in the nature and quality of government intervention and in a 
federal fiscal system the roles of the central and sub-central governments will have to 
undergo a significant change.   Ensuring a stable macroeconomic environment in a 
multilevel fiscal system requires coordination in stabilisation policies.  Similarly opening 
up the economy results in loss of revenue from customs duty and recouping the revenue 
loss requires coordinated calibration of tax reforms at central and state levels.   
Furthermore, creating a market-friendly environment in an open economy requires 
provision of competitive standards of physical and social infrastructure, a tax system 
which raises sufficient revenue for financing public services with minimum distortions, 
responsive governance and ensuring climate for free flow of trade and investment across 
the country.  While the sub-national governments will have to provide the public services 
assigned to them in efficient, responsive, and accountable manner, they have to 
calibrate counter-cyclical fiscal policy and redistribution functions in close coordination 
with the central government.   An important precondition for market promoting federalism 
is the hard budget constraint because fiscally responsible decision can come only under 
such an environment and therefore the policies should be calibrated to avoid bail-outs 




  Calibrating market oriented policy in a globalising environment requires reforms 
in the institutions including reforms in federal fiscal arrangements. This includes the 
changes in the assignment system, institutions and mechanisms to coordinate the 
policies and resolve centre-state and inter-state disputes.  These also involve, inter alia, 
reforms in the functioning of civil service, police, as well as judiciary.  These issues of 
reform in institutions, discussed at length,
1 can be undertaken only in the medium-and-
long term while in the short-term motivating the sub-national governments to coordinate 
their reforms with that of the central government will require incentives.  
   
  This paper analyses reforms in implementing fiscal policies in Indian fiscal 
federalism.  It also analyses the mechanisms introduced to coordinate these policies 
between the central and state governments.  Coordination in implementing policies is 
essential to ensure a stable macroeconomic environment, an efficient tax system, 
provide competitive levels of infrastructure, enable seamless nationwide market for 
factors and products, and to secure hard budget constraints.  Section 2 summarises the 
key lessons from the literature on the theories of fiscal federalism which will provide the 
framework for reforming both policies and institutions in Indian fiscal federalism.  Section 
3 summarises some of the salient features of Indian fiscal federalism which impinge on 
efficiency and to underline areas requiring intergovernmental coordination in calibrating 
reforms.  In section 4, we analyse and evaluate the content of reforms in incentivising the 
states to adhere to rule-based fiscal management, calibrating state tax reforms and in 
persuading the states to fast track reform in the sectors such as power and irrigation.  
The concluding remarks are presented in the last section.  
 
 
2. Important Features of Efficient Fiscal Federalism 
 
  The theoretical developments in fiscal federalism are classified into the first and 
second generation theories.  While the traditional theories called the first generation 
theories formerly assumed a benevolent state, the second generation theories draw on 
the developments in the theory of public choice and industrial organisation.  In the first, 
the trade-off is presented in terms of efficiency gains from meeting diversified 
preferences and inability to internalise the spillovers at the sub-national whereas, in the 
second, the trade-off is in terms of better “accountability” of decentralised levels versus 
better coordination of policies to internalise spillovers (Seabright, 1996; Oates, 2005).  
There are three different strands in the second generation theories which analyse fiscal 
federalism in (i) the principal – agent framework; (ii) problems arising from the soft 
budget constraints and deriving motivation from the fiscal crisis precipitated by 
exploitation of “fiscal commons” leading to perverse behaviour of sub-national 
governments, particularly in Latin America; and (iii) outcomes from “yardstick 
competition” under the rubric of “competitive federalism”.  These developments help to 
identify some important features of efficient fiscal federalism which are summarised in 
the following.  
 
One of the most important pre-conditions for efficient fiscal federalism is clarity in 
the assignment system.  Not only that the assignment system should be clear as far as 
possible, but when there is overlapping, there should be systems and institutions to 
                                                  
1 For a detailed discussion on the institutional reforms, see, Rao (2009) Rao and Singh (2005) 
especially, Chapter 14.  See also Singh and Srinivasan (2006).     
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resolve it. Clarity in assignments does not only imply mere assignment of revenue and 
expenditure powers; it is also necessary to ensure that the functions of different 
functionaries within a level are unambiguous.  Furthermore, the functions should be 
assigned according to comparative advantage. 
   
An important feature of a successful system of fiscal federalism is the 
assignment of adequate revenue powers to sub-national governments to forge a strong 
link between revenue and expenditures at the margin. This is necessary for both 
efficiency and accountability reasons.  Assignment of revenue powers is also necessary 
to ensure a hard budget constraint. 
   
The transfer system should address the problem of imbalance between revenue 
and expenditure powers and should enable every governmental unit to provide 
comparable levels of public services at comparable tax rates.  At the same time, it is 
important to ensure that the transfer system does not provide the incentive to “raid the 
fiscal commons”.  Ensuring proper incentive structure in the transfer system is critical to 
preventing the soft budget constraint.  It is necessary to ensure that the transfer system 
does not enable the states to pass on the burden of their public services to non-
residents.  In addition to equalisation transfers, specific purpose matching (open-ended) 
transfer should be designed to compensate the public services provided by the sub-
national governments, the benefit of which spill over the jurisdictions. 
  
A major advantage of a multilevel fiscal system is the large common market, but 
the benefit can accrue only when not only all impediments to trade in factors of 
production as well as commodities are removed, but also mobility of commodities, capital 
and goods is facilitated.  Ensuring a common market is at the heart of creating dynamism 
in fiscal federalism. Such impediments can be posed by policies restricting the 
movement of labour, capital, and commodities. 
   
The literature on market promoting federalism shows that it is important to avoid 
soft budget constraints at both national and subnational levels.  Efficient credit markets 
and a mature banking system alongwith a well developed debt market with efficient 
credit rating institutions is an important precondition for the centre to keep itself away 
from bailouts.  Similarly, well developed land and property markets and efficient mobility 
of factors and products can prevent public decisions that impede the development of 
markets.  These can promote intergovernmental competition and minimise incentives for 
bail outs.  It is important to discourage protectionist policies at sub-national levels.   
Legislatively imposed constraints on deficits and requirement to balance the current 
budget should place a limit on fiscal expansion and ensure more productive public 
spending.  Limitations placed on borrowings both internally and externally can also help 
to contain perverse incentives for fiscal expansion.  It is also necessary to have well 
designed bankruptcy laws that specify the nature of fiscal crisis and the way it needs to 
be handled. 
 
There can be gains from intergovernmental competition.  Competition can lead 
to efficiency gains in public service provision; it can also motivate innovations and 
productivity increases in public service delivery.  However, to reap the gains, it is 
important to ensure that there is a measure of competitive equality and predatory 
competition does not take place.  Unequal competition could be destabilising and can, in 
the extreme, break up the federation.  This is particularly important in the context of 
globalisation as the states with more developed markets and infrastructure can reap 
higher benefits from access to domestic and international markets and grow faster than  
 
8
those with less developed markets and infrastructure.  It is also important to regulate the 
competition, provide a negotiating platform and resolve inter-state and centre-state 
conflicts. 
  
While these are general principles, the reform of institutions in different countries 
will have to take account of their specific characteristics.    As stated by Oates (1999, p. 
1145),   “While the existing literature on fiscal federalism can provide some general 
guidance, …my sense is that most of us working in the field feel more than a little uneasy 
when proffering advice on many of the decisions that must be made on vertical fiscal and 
political structure.  We have much to learn”.  It must also be noted that even as 
institutional reforms required for achieving the desired characteristics including the hard 
budget constraint continue, it may achieve tangible results only in the short-and-medium-
term.  Furthermore, even when most of the desirable characteristics are achieved, there 
are important issues of coordinated implementation of reforms, be it in the area of 
containing deficits and debt, tax reforms, or reforms in public service delivery.  In many 
federal countries including India, these have been addressed through providing 
incentives to the states.  This paper analyses the effectiveness of incentivising reforms in 
India.   
  
 
3. Salient Features of Indian Federalism 
 
(i)   Role of the States in Indian Economy 
 
  While much of the discussion on economic reforms in India has focussed on 
economic liberalisation at the central level, there is relatively less attention on the 
reforms at the sub-national level.
2  This is not very surprising because, despite the crying 
need, reforms at the state level have been slow and inadequate.  This is also unfortunate 
because, in spite of a heavy centripetal bias, Indian Constitution assigns a predominant 
role to the states in the provision of social services and co-equal responsibility in the 
provision of physical infrastructure.  In fact, education and health are state subjects and 
their expenditure share is over 75 per cent of the total in spite of the recent initiatives by 
the central government in introducing schemes for universalising elementary education 
through Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan and National Rural Health Mission.  In agriculture and 
irrigation too, where the states have a predominant role, there are serious problems still 
to be tackled in terms of liberalising policies and creating infrastructure for agricultural 
extension, transportation, storage, and marketing.  A large number of irrigation projects 
continue to languish at various stages for want of adequate resources to complete them.  
In the power sector which is a concurrent responsibility, investment by the states in 
recent years in generation, transmission as well as distribution is negligible mainly 
because the electric utilities are unable to generate the surpluses needed for 
reinvestment on account of irrational pricing of electricity and poor operational efficiency.  
Similarly, the spending by the states on both maintenance of roads and bridges and 
creation of state highways, district and block level roads have been grossly inadequate.   
Ensuring basic standards of these social and physical infrastructures is critical for 
inclusive development of the country.  The central government has initiated several 
schemes involving specific purpose transfers in the areas in states’ domain and has 
                                                  
2  Of course, there are some notable exception to this, and these are Rao (1996, 2001), Ahluwalia 
(2002).   
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made significant investments in the areas of concurrent responsibility.  The design of the 
transfer schemes and the reforms initiated to change policies and measures undertaken 
to augment investments in social and physical infrastructure need to be critically 
analysed. 
 
(ii)   Impact of Political Developments 
 
  The increased involvement of the centre in states’ domain and substantial 
central investments in concurrent subjects is, in part, the reflection of the political 
developments in the country.  Although, the central intrusion into states’ domain by 
introducing a large number of central sector and centrally sponsored schemes has been 
in vogue for a long time, the recent political developments have resulted in the centre 
bypassing the states and making direct transfers to the implementing agencies with 
adverse consequences on both accountability and efficiency.  The emergence of 
coalition governments at the centre, regional parties in power in the states, and some 
regional parties being pivotal members of the coalition, has changed objective function of 
the political parties in a substantial measure.  The decline in the time horizon of 
politicians and parties has only added to the focus of governments on short term gains 
rather than focussing on longer term developmental agenda.  In this environment, when 
the opposing parties to the central coalition gain power in the states, to prevent them 
from getting electoral gains from central spending and to assert central ownership of 
these schemes, the government transfers funds directly to the implementing agencies.  
Besides fragmenting the transfer system, this gives rise to significant issues of design 
and implementation mechanism. 
   
  At the state level, the political developments pointed out above have resulted in 
two major outcomes.  The first is the increased populism in the states in terms of 
significantly increasing subsidies and transfers and reluctance to levy user charges on 
various services even when they are of “non-merit” nature.  The proliferation of populist 
schemes at the state level for short-term electoral gains is a case in point.   In the same 
vein, reluctance to levy user charges on services results in large implicit subsidies which 
is a common feature in the states.  In fact, proliferation of explicit and implicit subsidies 
has been a major problem in Indian fiscal federalism and despite a number of studies 
and two white papers placed in the Parliament on the issue in 1997 and 2004, very little 
has been done to phase them out or target them to the intended groups.  The 
consequences of these subsidies have not only been to increase the fiscal deficits but 
also to distort the allocation of resources in unintended ways.
3 
  
  The political economy factors have impacted on the pattern of resource 
allocation as well.  Taking up a large number of projects for implementation without 
adequate plan for financial closure has resulted in thin spread of resources and 
significant time and cost overruns in many of the infrastructure projects in most of the 
states.   There are several irrigation and power projects, some of them initiated three 
decades ago, still at various stages of completion.   This led the Government of India to 
initiate an accelerated power development programme and accelerated irrigation 
development programme to prioritise these projects, but despite this, the progress has 
                                                  
3 The study by Mundle and Rao (1991) first drew attention to the magnitude and composition of 
implicit and explicit subsidies in 1991, when the economic reforms programme was initiated.   
Subsequently, there have been several studies quantifying the subsidies and estimating its non-
merit component following the methodology given in the first study.  See also, Rao and Mundle 
(1993) and Mundle (2004).   
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been slow and the practice of taking large number of projects and spreading the 
resources thinly across several projects has continued.  
 
(iii)   Resolving Horizontal Imbalances 
 
  Indian fiscal federalism is characterised by a very high degree of horizontal fiscal 
imbalance.  The per capita net state domestic product (NSDP) in the richest state 
(Haryana) in 2007-08 was over 5.4 times that of the poorest state (Bihar) even when only 
the large states are considered.  Of course, the state with the highest per capita GSDP is 
the small state of Goa and if this is considered, the difference between the lowest and 
highest per capita GSDP state is 9.5 times.  In this environment, fully offsetting the fiscal 
disabilities of poorer states would require massive transfers to be made to them which 
could significantly soften their budget constraints.  In any case, in the Indian context, 
multiple agencies giving transfers and poorly designed transfer system has resulted in 
only a limited equalisation.  In addition, regional policy of the centre and various sources 
of “invisible transfers” have led to a significant volume of inequitable resource flows.
4  
Given the large differences in fiscal capacities of the states and the failure of the transfer 
mechanism to offset the fiscal disabilities of poorer states, there are wide variations in 
the standards of infrastructure and services provided across states, depending on their 
fiscal capacity.  This in turn has led to significant differences in the flow of private 
investments.  The inability to offset the fiscal disabilities of the states has also led to the 
introduction of several specific purpose transfer schemes to ensure minimum standards 
of services.   
 
(iv)   Co-ordinating Tax Policies in Fiscal Federalism 
 
An important issue in calibrating tax reforms in a federal system is the need to 
coordinate the reforms at central and state levels.  Efficacy of tax reforms will be greater 
when the reforms are carried out in a coordinated manner.  As mentioned earlier, with 
globalising reforms introduced in 1991, when the import duties were reduced, there was 
a significant decline in central revenues.  In contrast to many other countries which 
undertook domestic indirect tax reforms to recoup revenue loss from import duties, it was 
not possible to undertake this in India as the power to levy sales tax vests with the 
states. Thus, even as the central government undertook significant tax reforms following 
the report of the Tax Reform Committee (India, 1991), the gross tax revenue of the 




  The principle of fiscal federalism requires linking of revenue-expenditure 
decisions of sub national governments at the margin.  However, sub-national 
governments may not consider the overall interest of the economy while exercising their 
tax powers and this may result in significant inefficiencies.  It is important to ensure that 
the taxation by the states does not violate the principle of the common market by 
impeding mobility of factors and products.  It is also necessary that sub-national taxes do 
                                                  
4 Pinaki Chakraborty et. al. (2009) find that the spread of central government expenditure on social 
and economic services across state, is skewed in favour of high income states.  Similarly, Kavita 
Rao (2009) finds that the distribution of subsidies implicit in tax expenditures is inequitable.  
5 Ironically, revenue from even the central indirect taxes too declined during the period.  While the 
tax reforms in direct taxes resulted in increase in the tax revenue by one percentage point to GDP, 
the revenue from union excise duties declined by the same magnitude and the revenue from 
import duties declined by two percentage points resulting in the net decline by that amount.    
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not entail exportation of tax burden to non-residents. Furthermore, states may indulge in 
unstable competition by reducing the tax rates to attract investments or divert trade in 
their favour.  Such a competition resulting in “the race to the bottom” only results in the 
states losing revenue and creating distortions in resource allocation. 
   
Tax harmonisation both vertically between the centre and states and horizontally 
among different state governments is important from the viewpoint of minimising the 
collection cost, compliance cost, and cost to the economy in terms of the distortions 
disharmony creates.  Of course, a uniform tax system is the most harmonious as it 
minimises all the three costs mentioned above.  However, the very principle of fiscal 
federalism entails the choice to the states to vary their public service levels and tax rates.  
Thus, tax harmonisation in fiscal federalism involves a trade-off between welfare 
(efficiency) gains from fiscal autonomy and welfare (efficiency) loss from tax disharmony.  
While assignment of tax powers is important to link revenue expenditure decisions, it is 
important to ensure that individual states do not pursue tax policies that will have 
adverse impact on other states, do not violate the common market principle nor impede 
the development of markets. Any attempt to compare the tax system in unitary and 
federal countries, therefore, is inappropriate.  
  
  In India, the Constitution divides the tax powers based on the principle of 
separation.   The tax powers are listed either in the union or the state lists but not the 
concurrent list.  Although this was intended to prevent overlapping in tax powers, in 
effect, interdependence of tax bases of the centre and states could not be avoided.   
Thus, while agricultural income and wealth is subject to tax by the states, tax power on 
non-agricultural income and wealth has been assigned to the central government.  As a 
result, it has not been possible to levy income tax on a comprehensive concept of 
income and this has opened up an important avenue for evasion and avoidance of the 
tax.  In the case of indirect taxes, while the centre is assigned the powers to levy “excise 
duty on manufactured products” and through a later constitutional amendment, the taxes 
on services, the taxes on “sale and purchase of goods” are assigned to the states.       
Excise duty on manufactured products, in effect, is the manufacturers’ sales tax.  Thus, 
separation of tax powers has not prevented significant overlapping in the tax system.  
  
  The prevailing assignment of tax powers has not enabled the levy of efficient 
consumption tax system either by the central or state governments.  At the central level, 
the tax on goods cannot be levied beyond the manufacturing stage and the states cannot 
levy integrated taxes on goods with services as they do not have powers to levy the tax 
on the latter.  Furthermore, the central sales tax levied to track inter-state transactions 
has made the sales taxes levied by the states predominantly origin-based. There has 
been considerable attempt at reforming the tax system at both central and state levels to 
convert the cascading type sales taxes into value added taxes.   Despite this, achieving 
the goal of transforming the tax system into a destination based consumption type goods 
and services tax continues to be a major challenge. 
     
The state tax system in India is beset with a number of shortcomings.  As 
mentioned earlier, the states have found it politically difficult to levy taxation of 
agricultural incomes except in the case of a few plantation crops and this has prevented 
comprehensive taxation and opened up avenues for evasion and avoidance of taxes on 
incomes.  The long term reform in this area should essentially do away with the 
distinction between the sources of income. The states could be provided with concurrent 
tax powers to piggyback their levy on the base determined by the centre.  Of course, 
there should be allowance to offset losses and deduction of payment of insurance  
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against fluctuations in agricultural incomes.  On the indirect taxes side, the state sales 
taxes, even after the reforms to convert them into value added taxes (VAT) have a 
narrow base as consumption of services is excluded and the continuation of the central 
sales tax makes them predominantly origin based.  Furthermore, the entire indirect tax 
regime at the state level is segmented with a number of taxes coexisting such as 
purchase taxes, motor vehicles tax, passenger and goods tax, electricity duty, and 
entertainment tax which need to be unified into the goods and services tax.  Finally, the 
state and local taxes impede free flow of goods and services across the country.  While 
the central sales tax is a tax on the export of goods from one state to another, the levies 
such as entry tax and octroi are in the nature of taxes on import of goods into a local 
area.  Administration of these taxes requires the erection of checkposts or physical 
barriers and this violates the principle of common market within the country.       
Coordinated calibration of tax reform therefore, is extremely important to evolve a 
competitive tax system in the country.  
   
(v)   Ensuring a Stable Macro Economy 
 
  An important precondition for a successful market promoting federalism is the 
prevalence of hard budget constraint at sub national levels. The fiscal arrangements 
instituted in the constitution recognised the importance of this and had constrained the 
states from having recourse to unlimited borrowing powers.  Unlike the Latin American 
countries where unlimited international borrowing powers of the states was a cause of 
profligacy and bailouts resulting in soft budget constraints, the states in India do not have 
powers to borrow internationally.  However, Article 293 of the Constitution empowers the 
state governments to borrow from the domestic market, but if a state is indebted to the 
centre, it has to seek the permission of the latter to borrow.  The plan assistance from 
the centre to the states until 2003-04 was partly in the form of loans. therefore, all the 
states are indebted to the central government.  States’ borrowing, in effect, means the 
Union Finance Ministry, the Planning Commission, and the Reserve Bank of India 
together determine the quantum of market borrowing to be allowed to each of the states 
every year. 
   
  Despite the above restriction, there are several ways in which the states have 
been able to soften their budget constraints.  First, there are central government 
agencies such as the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), National Bank for Rural 
Development (NABARD) and Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) 
which have been authorised to lend money for specific sectors such as water supply, 
housing, and irrigation in the states. Second, the states can borrow the entire amount of 
subscriptions to small savings in their states from the National Small Savings Fund.   
Third, states may decide not to pay to electric utilities the subsidies arising from free 
supply of electricity to the farmers in any given year.  Fourth, states can actually use the 
public enterprises to borrow funds from the banks to overcome their immediate 
requirements.  Finally, in a system of cash accounting, to meet their liquidity problems, 
the states can collect taxes in advance from large taxpayers or delay payments to the 
contractors. There are also cases of the state governments securing borrowed funds 
from multilateral and bilateral agencies either to augment spending on specified sectors 
or for general budgetary support.  Although the states are not allowed to borrow directly, 
they can persuade the centre to borrow for them and on lend the resources to the states.  
Although lending from multilateral and bilateral agencies to the states have reform 
conditions, the incentive structure and political economy may not result in enforcing the  
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conditions and rather than improving the fiscal situation, it may in fact, further soften the 
budget constraint of the states (Rao and Chakraborty, 2007).  
      
  The problem with borrowing from various sources is not one of softening the 
budget constraint alone.   There is a larger issue of coordinating the calibration of 
macroeconomic stabilisation policy between the centre and states. This requires 
exercising overall control of deficits and debt of the states at sustainable levels.   
Although borrowings of the states are mainly determined by the centre as mentioned 
above, there are instances when the states deficits are extremely high and outstanding 
liabilities build up to unsustainable levels.  Besides securing loans which are outside the 
central control including the high interest bearing loans from the national small savings 
fund, the practice of central government advancing 70 per cent of the plan assistance as 
loans resulted in burgeoning deficits and build up of debt.  From time to time, the 
Finance Commissions had to recommend rescheduling and write-off of loans.  Over the 
years, this built the expectations of periodic write-off and demand for write-off became 
legitimate.  The Twelfth Finance Commission finally recommended that the practice of 
central government lending plan assistance to the states should be given up and the 
loan part of the assistance should be accessed from the market.  It also recommended 
an incentive based loan write-off to reduce the debt burden of the states as they 
improved their revenue deficits. 
    
  The introduction of various specific purpose transfer schemes from time to time 
has also led to softening the budget constraints of the states.  As mentioned earlier, 
these schemes are in sectors belonging to either the state or the concurrent list and to 
the extent, the central government spends money, the states can substitute their own 
spending.  Some of the schemes require matching contributions from the states.  In the 
case of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, for example, the states are required to contribute 30 per 
cent as against the central contribution of 70 per cent.  Although there no empirical 
studies available, it may not be incorrect to state that proliferation of central grants to 
augment several important social services has considerably softened their budget 
constraints.
6   
 
 
4.  Incentivising Reforms: Indian Experience 
 
 
The preceding analysis shows that effective calibration of fiscal reforms in a 
federal system requires proper coordination to ensure that the central and state 
governments do not work at cross purposes.  As the states look at the reform issue from 
the perspective of their own electorate and not from the viewpoint of the nation, there 
can be significant differences in the perspectives between the centre and states in terms 
of both speed and content of reforms.  In particular, macroeconomic stabilisation is 
mainly the function of the central government, but the states may not be interested in 
tightening their belt.  Similarly, although the resources for anti-poverty intervention will 
have to be raised from the national taxpayer, implementation of these policies will require 
the cooperation of the state and governments.  The information on who the poor are, 
where do they reside and why are they poor is available locally and therefore, the 
                                                  
6 The soft budget constraint is the reason for some of the states introducing populist schemes for 
short term electoral gains such as giving free colour TV sets to the poor in Tamil Nadu or not 
charging for various services including free and unmetered supply of electricity to the farmers in 
several states.  
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governments closest to the poor are the ones most suited to implement these policies.  
Even in the case of undertaking the allocation function, the priorities and perspective can 
differ widely and coordinating the implementation of policy reforms is essential. 
 
In this section, we discuss the experience of the central government providing 
incentives to the states to carry out fiscal reforms in India in terms of their efficacy.  We 
discuss the extent of success in providing incentives to the states to complete their long 
pending irrigation and power projects. We also examine the effectiveness of the 
incentives provided for improved fiscal management of the states, specifically in terms of 
containing their fiscal and revenue deficits.  Another important reform selected for some 
detailed analysis is the incentive provided to undertake tax reforms at the state level.  
Finally, the paper critically evaluates as many as 12 grants made by the 13
th Finance 
Commission for undertaking reforms in a variety of areas.  While the incentive based 
reforms in irrigation and power sectors were introduced by the central government 
directly, the reforms to draw the roadmap for fiscal consolidation, incentivise the adoption 
of GST and a variety of other grants given in diverse areas have been based on the 
recommendations of the Finance Commissions.  
 
(i)   Incentive Based Reforms Directly Introduced by the Central Government. 
  
(a)  Accelerated irrigation benefit programme 
 
  Irrigation is an important economic service in which the states play a major role. 
Given that agriculture as well as water resources are subjects assigned to the states in 
the constitution, although inter-state river water is the domain of the central government.   
Irrigation is an essential infrastructure for enhancing the agricultural productivity and 
therefore, over the years, the state governments have made substantial investments. 
Given the importance of the investments in enhancing agricultural productivity and due to 
political pressures, the states have initiated large numbers of irrigation projects without 
proper financial closure of the projects.  This has resulted in thin spreading of 
investments and consequently heavy cost and time overruns.  Moreover, poor 
maintenance of assets created, improper distribution of available water and commercial 
non-viability of even those projects that are categorised as commercial are other areas of 
concern.  In some states like Karnataka, irrigation projects were initiated even when 
there were objections from the lower riparian states and these were started as non-plan 
projects. 
 
Accelerated Irrigation Benefits Programme (AIBP) was started by the central 
government to provide funds to facilitate completion of ongoing large and medium 
irrigation projects that could be completed within four years so that their benefits are 
availed of relatively quickly. For projects in Kalahandi, Bolangir, and Koraput (KBK) 
districts of Orissa, funding for project start was also available. Similarly, although only 
one project at a time was to be funded in a state, projects dating back to the Fifth Plan or 
earlier could be taken up together. For getting funding, only a project that did not have 
any other funding except through the budget was normally considered. 
 
  The funding pattern has undergone frequent changes. Initially started as a 50 
per cent (of remaining project cost) loan assistance programme in 1996-97, it changed to 
a 66 per cent loan assistance for general category states and 75 per cent loan 
assistance for special category states in 1999-2000. These changed to 80 and 100 per 
cent respectively in 2002-03 for those states that agreed to undertake specified reforms.  
 
15
During 2004-05, 30 per cent of the assistance to general category states and 90 per cent 
of the same to special category states were converted into grants. In 2005-06, only the 
grants part was provided to the states, asking them to raise the loan part within its own 
borrowing programme. In 2006-07, further changes were made with assistance 
amounting to 25 per cent of approved project cost for general category and 90 per cent 
for special category states (also for defined drought-prone areas and flood-prone areas 
as well as the KBK districts of Orissa, and tribal areas) were provided as grants; the 
states were to raise the rest on their own. Figures for actual releases since the start of 
the programme show that the biggest beneficiaries of this programme have been 
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh.  
 
  Frequent changes in the funding pattern have caused some uncertainty among 
the states about the reliability of projected resource flows. This being a proposal based 
system of allocation of funds, states with greater expertise in project preparation with 
adequate documentation have an advantage. Further, because of the counterpart 
funding requirement, relatively poor states have not been able to take advantage of the 
programme to the full; their high levels of indebtedness make them wary of further debt. 
This is in fact a more general point that applies to most programmes with matching 
requirements. 
 
(b)  Accelerated Power Development and Reform Programme (APDRP) 
 
  The availability and quality of power  supply has become one of the major 
constraints to economic growth in India. In this sector, distribution (largely in the public 
sector under state electricity boards or companies) has been identified as the key 
problem area, impacting other aspects of power supply too. Hence, reform in the 
distribution of power has been a public priority for some time. Among various initiatives 
including fresh legislations during the last decade, Accelerated Power Development 
Reforms Programme (APDRP) was a central government initiative to provide the state 
level power utilities adequate funds for undertaking the necessary measures to 
strengthen the power transmission and distribution system through upgradation of worn-
out assets, reduced power losses, improve commercial viability with universal metering 
and pricing, and such other steps. The funding was through central assistance to the 
tune of 50 per cent of the approved project costs, of which half was given as grant, and 
the other half as loan. The states were to raise the other 50 per cent as counterpart 
funds, through loans from sector-specific sources like Power Finance Corporation or any 
other source of their own, including market borrowing. 
 
   With 75 per cent of the project costs to be financed through loans, the states 
were not too enthusiastic about this scheme; moreover, the various constraints faced by 
such major reforms (strong vested interests) proved to be serious enough to produce 
only limited impacts. The scheme has been revamped recently with a prefix ‘R’ added 
(for revised) as a central sector scheme. It has two parts: the first covers introduction of 
information technology (IT) for generating baseline data, energy auditing and accounting, 
and consumer services; the second part addresses the usual problems of power 
distribution (the key requirement being reduction of power losses). R-APDRP has a 
significantly different funding pattern, even though it is still based on loans; it is provided 
that the loans will be converted to grants upon successful achievement of the targets to 
the extent of the full amount for the first part of the scheme (IT) and up to 50 per cent of 




  The entire gamut of reforms in the power sector is, of course, far wider in scope 
starting from the reorganisation of the sector through unbundling of the generation, 
transmission and distribution aspects, corporatisation, privatisation and setting up of 
state level Electricity Regulatory Commissions (ERC) to improvement in delivery and 
pricing of power. Some of these have been adopted by a large number of states (e.g. 
unbundling and setting up of ERC), while some others have not been adopted by many 
states (complete privatisation of distribution has been undertaken by only two states – 
Orissa and Delhi). Since several reforms in this sector are complementary to one 
another, the success of R-APDRP also cannot be taken for granted. 
 
(c) Urban  reforms 
 
  Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM) is a central 
government programme for urban development with two broad sets of objectives – (a) 
improvement in the coverage and supply of urban infrastructure along with rejuvenation 
of urban local bodies; and (b) tackling the problem of urban slums through resettlement 
and other measures and providing basic services to the urban poor. Areas covered 
under (a) include urban transport, sewerage and sanitation, water supply, and 
construction of public facilities, among others. Assistance is given to implementing 
agencies, usually urban local bodies, parastatals or special purpose vehicles set up to 
carry out the proposed programmes, on the basis of city development plans prepared by 
them. The assistance is provided as grants, with the expectation that these resources 
would be adequately leveraged by generating further investment including private 
investments. 
 
(d)  Education sector reforms 
 
  In the area of elementary education, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) or ‘Education 
for All’ programme has been a large central government intervention to speed up full 
coverage of children aged 6-14. The basic idea that drove this programme was to 
substantially increase access to education through establishment of primary schools 
within one km. and upper primary schools within 3 km. of every village with a minimum 
prescribed population. Thus, the focus was on school infrastructure and included 
assistance for repairs and maintenance, and additions to existing infrastructure as per 
norms. Additionally, the programme provided for assistance towards district level and 
block level resource centres, teachers’ training, teaching-learning material and a small 
untied grant for teachers. Some encouragement was given in the scheme to build up the 
stake of the local bodies and parents of schoolchildren in the affairs of the school as well. 
Assistance was available for innovative activities (left unspecified) too. However, the 
overwhelming part of the cost of providing education, namely the salaries of teachers 
remained by and large the responsibility of the state governments. 
 
  The funds were provided on the basis of annual work plans built up from the 
block level to arrive at the state level plan. Thus, the assistance was formally demand-
driven in nature. The assistance was envisaged as a matching grant programme starting 
with 85:15 ratio, with the state contribution gradually rising over a period of ten years to 
50 per cent. With some interim modifications, the terminal sharing ratio will be applicable 
in 2011-12. A special education cess was levied on income tax to defray the cost of this 
programme. A condition of at least maintaining the state’s own base year expenditure 
was imposed to ensure additionality of SSA expenditures. While this programme has 
largely succeeded in meeting its immediate objective of filling the infrastructure gap, 
states are somewhat worried about the large number of additional teachers that have  
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been appointed for the new or expanded schools as per norms. The salary of these 
additional teachers would be a substantial additional expenditure for the states, coupled 
with the rising share of annual SSA costs. There have been some questions raised about 
the actual pattern of assistance across states; these do not seem to be inversely related 
to educational attainment indicators, as one would expect. Within states also, district-
wise patterns indicate the same feature. 
 
  The surge in reported enrolments and retention rates in elementary education 
were aided by the implementation of the central government mid-day meal programme. 
Formally introduced earlier, it was seriously implemented only after the Supreme Court 
exhorted the central and state governments to do so at the turn of the century. This is a 
scheme that was actually a state level initiative originally, with the state of Tamilnadu 
definitely the leader. Under this scheme, foodgrains are supplied by the central 
government along with a specified amount for defraying cooking costs, the state 
government supplying the other foodstuff. 
 
(e) Health  sector  reforms 
 
  National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) is the major central government 
programme in the area of health, primarily the domain of the states. It has an evolving 
structure, having begun in 2005 by putting together a number of disease specific 
programmes. This programme also has elements replicated from state level innovations 
like in situ female health workers with basic training (e. g. Mitanin in Chhattisgarh) or low 
cost insurance (Karnataka). 
 
  This programme began as a fully grants-based assistance system, changing into 
85:15 (centre: state) cost sharing during the 11
th Plan and then to 75:25 during the 12
th 
Plan. Safeguards are being put in place to ensure that central assistance does not 
substitute states’ own expenditures. The allocation of available funds among states is not 
on the basis of any prescribed formulae but district plans collated at the state level. 
 
(ii)   Reforms Undertaken on the Basis of the Recommendations of Finance 
Commissions 
 
(a) Tax  reforms 
 
  As mentioned earlier, the lack of coordination in tax reforms was one of the 
reasons for the decline in the tax ratio during the decade of 1990s.  Although the Tax 
Reform Committee (India, 1991, 1993) and the NIPFP study on domestic trade taxes 
(NIPFP, 1994) provided the blueprint for reforms and there was considerable discussion 
among the states through the Committee of State Finance Ministers, which was renamed 
as the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers, the actual implementation 
lagged behind.  There was some attempt at harmonising the sales tax system to avoid 
tax competition, but the reform transforming the cascading type sales taxes with several 
rates to a value added tax with two rates was not accomplished until April, 2005.  Even 
with this reform, the central sales tax which makes the tax system predominantly origin 
based has continued and there are still problems of relieving the taxes on inter-state 
transactions.   
 
  Implementing a major reform like the value added tax at the state level required 
the centre to assure that the loss of revenue if any, owing to implementation of reforms,  
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will be compensated fully by the central government.  Interestingly, as the economy 
during 2005-08 experienced high growth rates averaging more than 9 per cent, and due 
to better tax compliance resulting from the introduction of VAT, actual compensation paid 
to the states in four years beginning 2006-06 amounted to about Rs. 10095 crore which 
is less than 0.1 per cent of the sales tax collection. 
      
  Even after the introduction of VAT, the tax base continued to be narrow and a 
large number of other consumption taxes co-exist with the VAT.  The narrow base is due 
to the fact that the states can levy taxes only on goods and not on services.  Besides, 
there are a large number of exemptions (not the same set) in every state.  There are 
several other consumption taxes which contribute to inefficiency and distortions and 
some of them impede the free flow of goods across the country. Considering these and 
based on the recommendations of the Task Force on Indirect Taxes (India, 2003) and 
later, the Report of the Task Force on the implementation of FRBM Act, the Union 
Finance Minister, in his budget speech of 2006 stated, “…It is my sense that there is a 
large consensus that the country should move towards a national level Goods and 
Services Tax (GST) that should be shared between the centre and the states. I propose 
that we set April 1, 2010 as the date for introducing GST”. 
    
It was generally presumed that the GST will be a game changer and the tax 
reform needed to make the tax system efficient and productive.  Therefore, the 13
th 
Finance Commission, in its ToR was required to take into account, “…the impact of the 
proposed implementation of Goods and Services Tax with effect from 1
st April, 2010, 
including the impact on country’s foreign trade” and not work out the detailed modalities 
of implementation itself.  Instead, the Commission went about detailing the outline of “the 
model GST” – with features such as minimum exemptions, a single rate of tax on all 
goods and services uniformly levied across states, zero-rating of exports, and ensuring 
destination based tax to ensure seamless trade across the country.  It also 
recommended the “grand bargain” to be conducted between the centre and states with 
six elements namely, the design of GST to evolve the model GST, operational 
modalities, binding agreement between the centre and states with contingencies for 
changing rates and procedures, implementation schedule, disincentives for non-
compliance and the procedure to claim compensation.  It recommended a compensation 
package of Rs 50000 crore for any loss of revenue and that if all elements of the grand 
bargain are not satisfied, the compensation will not be payable. 
   
Any desirable tax reform should minimise the cost of compliance as well as the 
distortion cost while not increasing the cost of collection (Bird and Zolt, 2004) and GST 
reform is expected to minimise all the three costs though, the claim made by the NCAER 
study that the levy will result in an estimated GDP increase in present value terms 
between Rs 14.69 crore and Rs 28.81 crore seems to be much too exaggerated.   
Although the detailed methodology of the study is not available even in the NCAER study 
report, the very fact that the study is based on 2003-04 input-output table indicates that 
the productivity gains since 2003-04 including those arising from the introduction of VAT 
replacing the cascading type sales tax has not been taken into account.  In any case, 
with the type of shortcomings in the quality of data, to place faith in such estimates 
demands a leap of faith.  This is not to state that the reform is not important.  Surely, this 
will not be a “game changer” as the 13
th Finance Commission believes.  In fact, the 
introduction of VAT was a game changer and the GST reform should be seen as only the 




The point is that tax reform is a process and not an event and if the design 
aspects are not negotiable in the “grand bargain”, it is doubtful whether the reform can 
go further at all.  Even more retrograde was the estimate of revenue neutral rates made 
by the GST task force.  There are several problems with these estimates and to take four 
different estimates and taking an average shows that the task force itself does not have 
the conviction in any one of the methods (Rao and Chakraborty, 2010).   While everyone 
desires that the rate of tax should be low, to show a highly underestimated rate as 
revenue neutral as the task force did, forced the states to adopt extreme positions.  Not 
only that the revenue neutral rate estimated by the task force is far below what the states 
believe it to be, but there are wide variations in the revenue neutral rates across states.  
Thus, even if the central government gives compensation for three years, if there is a 
permanent decline in the revenues, the states with high revenue neutral rates fear loss of 
revenue, legitimate concern. 
    
It is important to note that the consumption tax reform involving the central and 
state governments will have to make a compromise between tax uniformity and fiscal 
autonomy.  While the aim should be to get the fundamentals of the reform right, 
compromise is unavoidable and the solution may have to settle at less than the best from 
the point of view of tax uniformity but allow some measure of fiscal autonomy.  To state 
that the “GST grant compensates for the seeming limitation in fiscal autonomy by 
enhancing expenditure autonomy through compensation payments and additional 
formulaic transfers” (p. 71), is to misunderstand the concept of fiscal autonomy 
altogether.  First, compensation is given against the loss of revenues and not a bribe for 
adopting the GST reform.  Second, fiscal autonomy under fiscal decentralisation means 
manoeuvrability to change standards of public services by changing tax rates and not 
simply softening the budget constraint to spend more money.   
 
Indeed, ideal design should be the goal, but in many states the socio-political 
considerations may not allow them to adopt uniform minimum exemptions and a single 
uniform rate.  In fact, even as economists recommended moving over to a single rate of 
VAT in Sweden recently, the government found it impossible to change over to a single 
rate.  Everyone knows that equity is better served by better targeting expenditures and 
not by having high and multiple rates and yet, political perceptions are hard to change.  
Bird and Gendron (2007, p. 13) show that in European Union the standard rate of VAT 
varied from 15 to 25 per cent with a mean of 19.4 per cent and except for Denmark, 
every other European country has one or more rates in addition to the standard rates.  It 
is not to argue that having multiple rates is desirable and surely, every effort should be 
made to minimise rate differentiation from the viewpoint of reducing the collection cost, 
compliance cost to the taxpayers, and distortions in the economy.  But these are political 
decisions and compromises are unavoidable.  The Commission’s approach of insisting 
on “all or nothing” rules out compromises altogether.  
   
  The recommendations of the 13
th Finance Commission have pushed the states 
to a defensive position and each state has been increasing the tax rate on the prevailing 
VAT with a view to secure assurance on adequate compensation if and when the reform 
is undertaken.   Thus, in some ways the report of the Task Force of the 13
th Finance 
Commission has been retrograde.  Of course, the entire reform now is mired in 
controversy and each state has taken a bargaining position it considers appropriate, 
even as the Union Ministry of Finance has assured the states that it will provide 
compensation for any loss of revenue.  In any case, it is unlikely that the reform will be 
implemented even in April, 2011 and hopefully, the issues pertaining to constitutional  
 
20
amendment and the structure and operational aspects of the dual GST will be resolved 
in time to implement the reform at least by April, 2012. 
 
(iii)  Fiscal Restructuring and Consolidation Reforms 
 
(a)  Recommendations of the 11
th Finance Commission 
 
The latter part of the 1990s saw a sharp deterioration in the fiscal situation at 
both central and state levels. Most analysts attribute the problem to significant pay and 
pension revision, but there are other important factors that contributed to the 
deterioration.  These include sharp decline in the central revenues from customs and 
excise duties, increase in the interest burden due to both increasing volume of 
indebtedness and higher interest rates and continued proliferation of subsidies and 
transfers. The gross tax revenue of the centre relative to GDP declined from 10.2 per 
cent in 1991-92 to 8.2 per cent in 2001-02 and this was due to two percentage point 
decline in customs duties, one percentage point decline in union excise duties which was 
offset by one percentage point increase in direct taxes.  Interest payments as a ratio of 
central revenues increased from 40.3 per cent in 1991-92 to 53.4 per cent in 2001-02.    
Even as revenue receipts relative to GDP showed a declining trend, the revenue 
expenditures as a ratio of GDP increased from 6.8 per cent in 1991-92 to 14.1 per cent 
in 2001-02.  All these factors culminated to create the worst fiscal imbalance scenario in 
2001-02 with the revenue and fiscal deficits as ratios of GDP at 7 per cent and 10.3 per 
cent respectively (Table 1; Figure 1). 
  
Table 1: Fiscal Indicators of Central and State Governments 
(percent of GDP) 



















1996-97 1.2 0.9 2.7 2.4 -0.2 4.1 3.6 1.3 6.4
1 9 9 7 - 9 8  1 . 10 . 9 2 . 93 . 10 . 54 . 84 . 12 . 1 7 . 3
1 9 9 8 - 9 9  2 . 52 . 2 4 . 33 . 90 . 75 . 16 . 43 . 7 9 . 0
1 9 9 9 - 0 0  2 . 82 . 4 4 . 73 . 50 . 85 . 46 . 33 . 8 9 . 5
2 0 0 0 - 0 1  2 . 51 . 8 4 . 34 . 10 . 95 . 76 . 63 . 7 9 . 5
2001-02 2.7 1.4 4.1 4.4 1.5 6.2 7.0 2.9 10.3
2002-03 2.3 1.3 4.1 4.4 1.1 5.9 6.7 2.4 10.0
2 0 0 3 - 0 4  2 . 31 . 5 4 . 43 . 60 . 04 . 55 . 91 . 4 8 . 9
2 0 0 4 - 0 5  1 . 20 . 7 3 . 42 . 50 . 04 . 03 . 70 . 6 7 . 4
2 0 0 5 - 0 6  0 . 20 . 2 2 . 52 . 60 . 44 . 12 . 80 . 6 6 . 6
2006-07   -0.6 -0.4 1.9 1.9 -0.2 3.4 1.3 -0.6 5.3
2007-08 -0.9 -0.65 1.4 1.1 -0.9 2.7 0.2 -1.6 4.1
2008-09 -0.1 1 2.6 4.5 2.6 6 4.4 3.6 8.6
2009-10 
( R E )  0 . 62 . 1 3 . 25 . 33 . 26 . 75 . 95 . 3 9 . 9
2010-11 
( B E )  1 . 52 . 8 3 . 54 . 01 . 95 . 55 . 54 . 7 9 . 0














Although macroeconomic stabilisation is predominantly a central function, 
coordination in fiscal management is extremely important in calibrating counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy.  Right from the late 1980s, lack of fiscal discipline at both central and state 
levels has been a matter of concern and various Finance Commissions beginning the 
Sixth have expressed their misgivings about this.  However, it is expected that the 
central government will behave in a responsible manner as the adverse consequences 
of poor fiscal management could impact electoral outcomes.  In order to motivate the 
states to follow fiscal discipline, providing appropriate incentives was thought to be the 
right method. Thus for the first time, the Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC) was given 
the task of inter alia, “review the state of finances of the Union and States and suggest 
ways and means by which the Governments collectively and severally may bring about a 
restructuring of the Public Finances so as to restore budgetary balance and maintain 
macro-economic stability.”  As the main report was subjected to criticism
7 that the 
commission did not consider the fiscal performance of the states, an additional term of 
reference was given to “…draw a monitorable fiscal reforms programme aimed at reduction 
of revenue deficit of the State and recommend the manner in which the grants to the states 
to cover the assessed deficit in their non-plan revenue account may be linked to progress in 
implementing the programme.”   
 
The Commission pooled 15 per cent of the fiscal gap grants it had recommended in 
the main report and added an equal amount from the centre to create an incentive fund and 
allocated it according to the population shares of the states.  Individual states were to get 
this incentive amounts in full on the basis of the extent to which they fulfilled the single 
monitorable target – a minimum improvement of 5 percentage points in the ratio of revenue 
deficit/surplus and revenue receipts every year with 1999-2000 taken as the base year.  
The available incentive grant was not to lapse for any state until the last year of the award 
                                                  
7 The severest criticism was by the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh whose party was a pivotal 
coalition partner at the centre.     
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period, when the lapsed amounts were to be added to total pool available for qualifying 
states.  The Ministry of Finance, Government of India, was the agency implementing the 
scheme and a Monitoring Committee was also set up with official and non-official members 
to oversee the implementation of the scheme. 
 
This scheme was to be elaborated though a Medium-Term Fiscal Restructuring 
Policy (MTFRP) by each state, with the MTFRP aiming for compression of gross fiscal 
deficit to 2.5 per cent of GSDP, reduction of revenue deficit to zero, and limiting interest 
payment to less than 18-20 per cent of revenue receipts.  Specific recommendations on the 
medium-term growth of salaries and wages and interest payments, as well as reduction in 
explicit subsidies were also made.  Four areas were singled out for special attention in the 
context of reforms – (a) fiscal reforms including those in taxation, non-tax revenues, public 
sector employment and public expenditure; (b) power sector reforms; (c) restructuring of 
public sector undertakings; and (d) budgetary reforms, particularly in the context of 
enhancing transparency. 
 
  There were a number of problems with both design and implementation of the 
proposed scheme.  First, the volume of incentive linked grants was too small to make any 
significant difference to the outcomes.  As far as the design is concerned, monitoring of 
fiscal performances of the states was done on the basis of the single measure of revenue 
deficit to revenue receipts ratio.   Each state, irrespective of the level of its deficit has to 
reduce the percentage of revenue deficit to its total revenue by 5 percentage points if it was 
to get the incentive linked grant.  Thus, the size of the prevailing revenue deficit was not a 
consideration in setting the target for deficit reduction.  Furthermore, the denominator in the 
performance measure, revenue deficit to revenue receipts can change not only due to 
states’ own effort but also due to changes in the volume of central transfers.  The main 
issues were that there were too many recommendations that were not necessarily 
consistent with the desired change in the single monitorable indicator.  The idea of making 
grants-in-aid to meet assessed deficits conditional upon reforms were also debated. These 
have been discussed in detail in the literature and the 12
th Finance Commission which was 
asked to review the scheme did not recommend its continuation.  
  
(b) 12
th Finance Commission 
 
The finances of both central and state governments started showing 
improvement since 2001-02, due to improved tax collections owing to the acceleration in 
the growth of the economy and due to the higher base effect, as the salary hike was 
already completed.  Even so, because the structural causes of fiscal imbalance had not 
been addressed, concerns on large deficits persisted.  In fact, in spite of the fiscal reform 
facility introduced by the Eleventh Finance Commission, the fiscal deficit of the states 
relative to GDP increased from 4.64 per cent in 1999-2000 to 4.97 per cent in 2003-04 
as against the target of 2.97 per cent, and the revenue deficit declined only marginally 
from 2.82 per cent to 2.67 per cent as against the target of eliminating it. Therefore, the 
ToR of the Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC) stated, “The Commission shall review the 
state of the finances of the Union and the States and suggest a plan by which the 
governments, collectively and severally, may bring about a restructuring of the public 
finances restoring budgetary balance, achieving macro-economic stability and debt 
reduction along with equitable growth” (India, 2004). 
 
The Commission worked out a restructuring plan and set the target for the 
consolidated fiscal deficit at 6 per cent of GDP; the revenue deficit was to be eliminated 
by 2009-10.  The target for the centre was set at 3 per cent of GDP and for each of the  
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states at 3 per cent of GSDP.  It recommended that each of the states should enact a 
fiscal responsibility legislation with a view to eliminate revenue deficit and compress 
fiscal deficit to 3 per cent of GSDP by 2008-09.   This was made a precondition for 
availing the debt relief and followed a two-pronged approach: first, a general scheme of 
debt relief applicable to all the states and second, a write off scheme linked to 
improvement in fiscal performance. The Commission consolidated and rescheduled the 
central loans to states until end March 2005, repayable in 20 years and bearing an 
interest rate of 7.5 per cent. The repayment due of central loans to states after the 
consolidation and rescheduling during 2005-06 to 2009-10 was to be written off by the 
extent of absolute reduction in the revenue deficit as compared to the base year 
(average of 3 years, 2001-04). 
    
Interestingly, there has been a significant improvement in the fiscal situation at 
both central and state levels since 2003-04 until 2008-09, when it deteriorated sharply 
because of a variety of factors.  The consolidated fiscal deficit declined relative to GDP 
from 8.9 per cent in 2001-04 to 4.1 per cent in 2007-08 (Table 1).  Similarly, revenue 
deficit declined from 5.9 per cent in 2003-04 to 0.2 per cent in 2007-08.  Furthermore, 
improvements were seen at both central and state levels (Figure 1).  
   
  In 2008-09, however, there was a sharp reversal of the trend.  The fiscal deficit 
increased sharply from 4.1 per cent in 2007-08 to 8.6 per cent in 2008-09 and further to 
9.9 per cent in 2009-10.  Similarly revenue deficit increased from 0.2 per cent in 2007-08 
to 4.4 per cent in 2008-09 and further to 5.9 per cent in 2009-10.  Deterioration in the 
fiscal situation was seen both at the central and state levels though it was much more in 
the former.  
   
Was the improvement in the fiscal situation until 2007-08 attributable to the fiscal 
restructuring plan of the TFC? The answer to this question is seen in the detailed 
analysis of the fiscal performances of the centre and states.
8  There were a number of 
problems in achieving the targeted reduction in revenue and fiscal deficits.  First, the 
central government resorted to a lot of “creative accounting” to push deficits outside the 
budget such as issuing oil and fertiliser bonds.  Second, even with this, the centre could 
not achieve the target of phasing out revenue deficit and even in the best year (2007-08) 
it was one per cent of GDP.  Third, to the extent that there was improvement in fiscal 
deficit, it was mainly due to increase in the income tax revenues and to some extent 
revenue from service tax.  The former increased mainly due to the introduction of tax 
information network (TIN) and its effective implementation.  This was also partly due to 
the swapping of high interest bearing with low interest bearing debt.  However, non-
interest bearing expenditures continued to increase contrary to the detailed restructuring 
plan worked out by the Task Force for the Implementation of FRBMA. (India, 2004a). 
Thus fiscal responsibility legislation has had very little to do with the improvement. 
   
As far as the states are concerned, between 2003-04 and 2007-08, there was 
2.8 percentage point improvement to GDP in the revenue deficit position and this has 
helped to reduce the fiscal deficit by 2.1 percentage points.  It is also seen that 
improvement in the revenue deficit due to larger revenue collections was 2.1 points or 
about 78 per cent and the expenditure reduction was only due to lower interest 
payments.  Of the 2.1 points improvement in revenues, the contribution of own tax 
revenues was 0.7 points and tax devolution and grants from the centre contributed to 1.4 
                                                  
8 For a detailed analysis of the fiscal trends in centre and states, see, Rao (2009).   
 
24
percentage points improvement and the latter was mainly due to the buoyancy of income 
tax and service tax revenues.  On the expenditure side, the adjustment was only 0.6 
percentage point and this is almost entirely due to lower interest payments.  Besides 
lowering of interest rates due to the debt swap scheme adopted in 2004-05, lower 
volume of borrowings from the National Small Savings Fund and to some extent, write 
off of debt repayment as per the recommendation of the TFC have contributed to the 
improvement. 
   
Surely, economic slowdown in 2008-09 has adversely impacted on the state 
finances significantly.  Available information on the revised estimates for 14 states for 
2008-09 shows that the position has deteriorated as owing to the slowdown in the 
economy and declining tax devolution and the revenue surplus is likely to be reduced by 
about 0.2 per cent of GDP and fiscal deficit might increase by about 0.7 per cent.  Most 
of the states for which information is available only began to undertake the pay revisions 
and when the fiscal positions in other states are also considered, the states taken 
together may not generate any revenue surplus and may end up with the fiscal deficit of 
about 3.5 per cent of GSDP which is equivalent to 3 per cent of GDP.  While these 
targets conform to the targets set by the TFC in the fiscal restructuring plan, the situation 
is far from being comfortable.  This is because, in the following year (2009-10), when the 
impact of pay revision in all the states are more substantially effected and the impact of 
economic slowdown on the states’ own tax revenues and tax devolution is taken account 
of, substantial revenue deficit is likely to re-emerge and the fiscal deficit may therefore 
increase substantially.  
   
  Was the deterioration in the fiscal health in 2008-09 due to the fiscal stimulus 
given to combat the economic slowdown?  A closer examination shows that the slippage 
was mainly because there was significant under provision of expenditures in the 2008-09 
budget estimates and during the course of the year expenditures had to be provided to 
fund the commitments made in the budget.  Although the budget speech announced the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission, increase in the 
coverage of the National Rural Employment Guarantee from 200 districts to 600 districts, 
introduction of the loan waiver scheme and additional allocation to various flagship 
programmes, expenditure liabilities on these accounts were not included and therefore, a 
massive supplementary demand had to be placed in the Parliament.  Thus, the 
deterioration in the fiscal situation was not due to any stimulus package, though, these 
expenditures certainly provided additional stimulus to the economy.  At the state level 
too, the implementation of pay revision has resulted in both revenue and fiscal deficits 
exceeding the limits placed by the fiscal responsibility legislations.
9  Of course, two 
states, Sikkim and West Bengal did not choose to enact the legislations; also Punjab and 
Kerala, even when they passed the legislations, observed the targets only in their 
violation.   
 
   (c)  Thirteenth Finance Commission 
 
The revised road map for fiscal consolidation charted by the 13
th Finance 
Commission is, in many ways, a continuation of the map laid down by the 12
th Finance 
Commission.  The fiscal deficit target is set to be consistent with the targeted debt to 
GDP ratio.  The consolidated debt to GDP ratio is targeted to decline from 78.8 per cent 
                                                  
9 The deficit targets were relaxed by 0.5 per cent in 2008-09 and a further 0.5 per cent in 2009-10.  
Even so, several states appear to have exceeded the revised deficit targets.  
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in 2009-10 to 67.8 per cent in 2014-15.  In consistence with this, the fiscal deficit is 
supposed to be reduced from 9.5 per cent to 5.4 per cent during the period.  The central 
government is required to reduce its outstanding debt to GDP ratio from 54.2 per cent in 
2009-10 to 44.8 per cent in 2014-15 and its fiscal deficit target is set to reduce from 6.8 
per cent to 3 per cent and revenue deficit from 4.8 per cent to a surplus of 0.5 per cent 
during the period.  
   
The 13
th Finance Commission has recommended the revised roadmap for fiscal 
consolidation and in order to impart effectiveness to the process, it has made a series of 
recommendations to make the FRBM process (i) transparent and comprehensive; (ii) 
sensitive to countercyclical changes; and (iii) institute a system to effectively monitor the 
compliance.  The measures to make the system comprehensive and transparent include 
preparation of a more detailed medium term fiscal plan (MTFP) to put forward detailed 
estimates of revenues and expenditures and to make it a statement of “commitment” 
rather than merely one of “intent”. It has recommended a number of micro measures 
such as putting forward the economic and functional classification of expenditures as a 
part of MTFP, preparing the detailed statement on central transfers to states, reporting 
compliance costs on the major tax proposals, presenting the revenue consequences of 
capital expenditures, fiscal fallout of PPPs, preparation of an inventory of vacant land 
and buildings valued at market prices by all departments and enterprises.  The 
Commission has recommended that the values of parameters underlying the projection 
of revenues and expenditures in the MTFP should be made explicit and the band within 
which the parameters can vary when there are exogenous shocks while remaining within 
the FRBM targets.  It has also recommended that the nature of shocks warranting the 
relaxation of FRBM targets should be specified.  The stimulus to the states should be in 
terms of larger devolution rather than increased borrowing limits and the centre should 
meet this additional cost.  Most importantly, the Commission has recommended the 
setting up of a committee which will eventually transform into a Fiscal Council to conduct 
an annual independent public review and monitoring of the FRBM process.  The Council 
should be an autonomous body reporting to the Ministry of Finance, which in turn should 
report to the Parliament on matters dealt with by the Council. 
    
Many of the recommendations are important, but the question is whether the 
Commission has gone beyond its mandate to micro manage the process.  In fact, some 
of the recommendations such as keeping the inventory of land and buildings are 
important to ensure the comprehensiveness of the budget but may not be feasible for the 
immediate implementation of the FRBM.  For the present, it should be enough to make 
both the centre and states to get a comprehensive picture of their financial assets and 
liabilities including the list of guarantees given.  Of course, requirements such as 
presenting compliance costs of various tax proposals have formidable data problems 
with the taxpayers unwilling to disclose the costs such as the amount of bribe paid to tax 
officials.  The NIPFP study in 2002 by Arindam Das-Gupta had to rely on a small sample 
to make the estimates.   Experience has also shown that FRBMA can be successful only 
when the government, not just the Finance Ministry, has a strong will to embrace fiscal 
discipline.  Mere passing of the FRBMA and presenting the detailed MTFP with all the 
details recommended does not translate the intent into commitment.  Has the 
government not been presenting the documents on outcome budgeting and revenue 
foregone from various tax exemptions and concessions without much effect? 
Furthermore, without the involvement of the various spending departments in the 
preparation of MTFP, it will be impossible to ensure discipline from them.  How much 
faith can we repose on the capacity of the proposed committee which will evolve into a 
Fiscal Council to undertake independent review and monitoring of the process?  Given  
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that the Council will be appointed by the Finance Ministry and will report to it, how 
independent will the review be and how effective will the monitoring process be?  In any 
case, without the government’s willingness, institutions cannot ensure fiscal discipline 
and it remains to be seen, how far the Government will move in this direction. 
   
  An important feature of the 13
th Finance Commission’s recommendations is a 
plethora of conditionalities imposed on both central and state governments.  Ideally, the 
recommendations implementing the reforms should rely on the mechanism of incentives 
to enforce them and specific purpose transfer is the most important instrument used.  
When properly designed, these can be very effective, particularly in altering the spending 
priorities of the states to ensure minimum standards of services in respect of services 
with significant inter-state spillovers.  In some cases incentives should be mixed with 
penalties in order to make the conditions effective. 
   
Surely, there are economic reasons for giving conditional transfers and 
stipulating conditions is a part of providing incentives to ensure provision of normative 
minimum standards of the specified service. In designing the conditions and 
recommending implementation mechanisms, however, some important factors must be 
kept in mind.  First, the incentives should be sufficiently sizeable and effective to make 
the parties comply with the conditions.  Second, it is important to ensure that the 
conditions imposed are within the capacity of the parties to comply.  Third, the conditions 
should be well designed.  It is particularly important to target the conditions to ensure 
that the penalty for failure to comply will be on the non-compliant, and not others.   
Furthermore, the targets should be realistic and when the issue involves negotiations 
and agreements between the centre and states on the one hand and among the states 
inter-se on the other, although it is desirable to set ideal targets, in the given environment 
of political economy, the conditions should be flexible enough to accommodate 
departures from the ideal.  
 
As mentioned above, the 13
th Finance Commission has recommended a 
plethora of conditions both to ensure minimum standards of expenditure and to 
incentivise central and state governments to undertake reforms.  Indeed, both complying 
with and enforcing the various conditions is going to be a challenge and some states 
have questioned the conditionalities on the grounds of encroachment in their fiscal 
autonomy.  There are also issues of enforcing conditions when these do not involve 
either ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’.  In fact, the conditions imposed on the centre do not involve 
either incentive payments or penalty.  Furthermore, there is an asymmetry in the 
enforcement of conditions.  In the case of the states, the enforcement will be done by the 
central government whereas for the latter, it is both the player and the umpire.  This 
exemplifies what has been said:  while the Finance Commissions can only bark at the 
centre, they can bite the states!   
 
Apart from the large number of conditions, there are problems of design and 
implementation.  First, unlike in the case of 12
th Finance Commission which 
recommended debt write off and rescheduling linked to fiscal adjustment, the 13
th 
Finance Commission’s conditions to the states’ fiscal consolidation does not entail any 
incentive payments except in the case of the states which did not pass fiscal 
responsibility legislation as required by the 12
th Finance Commission.  Failure to stick to 
the fiscal restructuring plan would deprive the states of their state-specific grants. Of 
course, the central government will have the role of enforcing the other conditions but 
can it withhold any portion of tax devolution or revenue gap grants for non-compliance?  





5. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
  The experience of incentivising reforms at the state level cannot be termed an 
unqualified success by any means, nor is it a total failure.  There are elements of 
incentives which have succeeded though, but on the whole, it has not been able to 
accomplish the objectives in entirety such as ensuring standards of essential physical 
and social infrastructure, motivating the tax reforms in states, urban renewal, or fiscal 
prudence. 
 
  The fact that the experiments were not an unqualified success does not mean 
that the attempt should be given up.  They provide valuable lessons for improving the 
design and implementation mechanisms.  Firstly, it is important for the central 
government to follow what it preaches.  In particular, the central government should 
provide a clear lead in fiscal consolidation and only then can it motivate the states to 
follow disciplined calibration of fiscal policy.  Unfortunately, there is no way the central 
government can be incentivised in undertaking reforms.  It is difficult to solve the problem 
of soft budget constraint at central level and only electoral dissatisfaction arising from 
poor policy calibration can motivate reforms.  Second, the reforms should have an 
impact on the margin of the targeted variables.  Therefore, considerable effort should be 
made to design the targets.  Third, the incentives should be strong enough for the states 
to adopt them.  If they are not strong enough, they will fall on the wayside.  The example 
of the 11
th Finance Commission to link the grants with the reduction in revenue deficits 
was simply not accepted by the states.  Similarly, there were grants recommended for 
the creation of data banks on panchayats by the 11
th Finance Commission which was 
simply not undertaken. 
    
  It must also be noted that while incentivising reforms at the state level can 
motivate reforms in a limited way this cannot be a substitute for hardening the budget 
constraint.  In other words, it is important to undertake reforms to ensure hard budget 
constraints at the state level.  The reform recommended by the 12
th Finance 
Commission, of avoiding the centre lending to the states and bringing market discipline 
to states’ borrowing is therefore an important one.  The compulsions of coalition politics 
have resulted in several measures through which the states have been able to soften the 
budget constraint and bringing about market discipline among the states is an important 
challenge. 
 
  In the final analysis, political incentive is the best incentive to undertake 
economic reforms and there are examples, though isolated, to show that the long term 
reform policies can also be the political winners.  The important long term reform of 
governance and developmental policies undertaken in Gujarat and more recently Bihar, 
have been politically rewarding as well.  In fact, this has the potential to trigger healthy 
intergovernmental competition at the states level thorough the “Salmon mechanism” 
which can lead to improved developmental outcomes.  Under this, the electorate as well 
as the opposition parties in the state benchmark the performances of the better 
performing states and pressurise the incumbent government to provide the benchmarked 
standards of services (Breton, 1996; Salmon, 2006).  While this can be a long term 
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